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Expertise, Uncertainty, and International
Law: A Study of the TallinnManual on
Cyberwarfare
OLIVER KESSLER AND WOUTER WERNER∗
Abstract
Howshould international lawdealwith theuncertainty arising from the rise of irregular forms
of warfare? In the past decade, this question has been the topic of several reports produced by
internationalgroupsofexpertsintheﬁeldofconﬂictandsecuritylaw.Themostrecentexamples
include the study on the notion of the ‘direct participation in hostilities’ under the auspices
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Tallinn Manual on cyberwarfare
prepared at the invitation of NATO. In this article, we discuss the Tallinn Manual, showing
how experts faced with uncertainty as to the law’s precise scope and meaning construct legal
interpretations, legal deﬁnitions, and institutional facts and norms that can be used to make
senseofacontingentworld.At thesametime,weargue, this absorptionofuncertaintyproduces
new uncertainty. Consequently, the power of experts does not reside in their knowledge, but
in their control andmanagement of uncertainty and non-knowledge.
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1. INTRODUCTION
How should international law deal with uncertainties resulting from the rise of
irregular forms of warfare? In the past decade this question has been the topic of
several reports produced by international groups of experts in the ﬁeld of conﬂict
and security law.Themost recent examples include the studyon thenotionof ‘direct
participation in hostilities’ under the auspices of the International Committee of
the Red Cross and the Tallinn Manual on Cyberwarfare, prepared at the invitation
of NATO.1 The use of experts to articulate applicable rules of international law is
far from novel, of course. The International LawAssociation, for example, has since
1873 brought together legal experts in an attempt to ‘study, clarify and develop’
∗ Professor of International Relations at the University of Erfurt; International Scholar at Kyung Hee
University, South Korea [oliver.kessler@uni-erfurt.de]; and Professor at the VU University, Amsterdam
[w.g.werner@vu.nl].
1 Note, however, that the studyondirect participation inhostilitieswas eventually published as a document of
the ICRC, because several expertswithdrew their names from the project due to fundamental disagreements
regarding the interpretation of some key terms of international humanitarian law. The study is available
at: www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ﬁles/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. Some other reports dealingwith the articulation of
law in the area of conﬂict and security law include the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable
to Armed Conﬂicts at Sea, the Red Cross Study on Customary Law, or the HarvardManual on Air andMissile
Warfare.
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international law.2 With the establishment of the International Law Commission
in 1947 theUnitedNations formally institutionalized the role of legal experts in the
codiﬁcation and progressive development of international law.3 Since the Second
WorldWar, the institutionalizationof legalexpertise inthearticulationofapplicable
law has proliferated, as is evidenced by, inter alia, the establishment of the United
NationsCommissiononInternationalTradeLawor theworkof specializedagencies.
The most important task of the recently established committees in conﬂict and
security law is to articulate the applicable international law in a speciﬁc (sub)ﬁeld.
The term ‘articulate’ is chosen deliberately here, as experts are generally not asked
to–anddonotclaimto–makelawbut insteadtoarticulate thelawasitalreadyexists.
At the same time experts do more than stating the obvious. Faced with uncertainty
as to the law’s precise scope and meaning, they construct legal interpretations and
inject themwith a legitimacy claim based on their expertise. Their aim is to absorb
uncertainty by producing interpretations, legal deﬁnitions, institutional facts, and
legal norms that can be used to make sense of a contingent world.4
The increased importance of legal expertise in several functional ﬁelds today
should not come as a surprise. International law has undergone a process of rapid
expansion and increasing specialization, just like law at the domestic level has
grownanddeveloped into specialized sub-areas.5 Thenet effect of the expansionand
specialization of international law has been paradoxical. On the one hand, almost
all international decision-making now takes place in aweb of legal deﬁnitions, legal
rules, and legal principles. As the International Law Commission has noted: ‘[i]t is
difﬁcult to imagine today a sphere of social activity that would not be subject to
some type of international legal regulation.’6 This even holds true for the ﬁeld of
international security, a ﬁeld which has traditionally been regarded as the realm of
highpolitics.AsKennedyhasargued, thepoliticsofwar today isapoliticsalso fought
out in the language of international law; with all participants in armed conﬂict
invoking legal provisions to bolster their cause.7 On the other hand, the abundance
and specialized nature of legal instruments has made it much more difﬁcult to
actually know what the law requires – especially for those who are not specialized
in a particular legal ﬁeld. International law is now split up in an ever-growing
2 See www.ila-hq.org (accessed 18 January 18 2013).
3 For a study of the International Law Commission from the perspective of ‘legal expertise’ see J. S. Morton,
The International Law Commission of the United Nations (2000). The part on the ILC’s mandate for progressive
development is interesting when read against the background of legal expertise. Apparently, the General
Assembly believed that having legal expertise implies not only knowledge of international law, but also the
most reliable opinions for how international law ought to develop.
4 Fromtheperspective of ouruncertainty approach, thepowerof expertise is related to theﬁxationofmeaning
in giving structure to uncertainty and turning it into manageable risks. See author for a longer discussion.
5 See the discussion of Habermas’s views on law inM. Deﬂem (ed.),Habermas, Modernity and Law (1996).
6 Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law:
Difﬁculties Arising from the Diversiﬁcation and Expansion of International Law, A/CN.4/L.702, para. 4.
7 D. Kennedy,Of Law andWar (2006). Anecdotal evidence of Kennedy’s point can be found in the complaints
by former NATO supreme allied commander Europe, General Jones: ‘It used to be a simple thing to ﬁght a
battle . . . In a perfect world, a general would get up and say, “Follow me, men”, and everybody would say
“Aye, sir” and run off. But that’s not the world anymore . . . [now] you have to have a lawyer or a dozen. It’s
become very legalistic and very complex.’ See L.W.Winik, ‘AMarine’s ToughestMission’, Parade, 19 January
2003, quoting General J. L. Jones, a formerNATO commander, explaining how the legalistic nature of today’s
warfare has complicated the ﬁght.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 23 Dec 2013 IP address: 130.37.129.78
EXPERTISE, UNCERTAINTY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 795
number of subﬁelds, each with their own norms, rules, precedents, vocabularies,
authorities, professional biases, and expert knowledge.8 Decision-makers are thus
called to operate in a legal environment which has become more important than
ever before and yet increasingly difﬁcult to disclose. As a consequence, legal experts
have become indispensable in many ﬁelds of contemporary decision-making and
politics. Just like the growth and compartmentalization of scientiﬁc knowledge has
spurred on calls for experts, the expansion and fragmentation of international law
has lifted the role of legal experts in world politics.9
The role of international legal experts in different areas has become even more
important in light of some foundational challenges to international law. In the ﬁeld
of international security, for example, the rise of issues such as irregular warfare,
terrorism, targeted killing, or cyberwar has called into question some constitutive
distinctions of peace and security law, including the distinctions between coercion
and force, war and peace, combatant and civilian, or military and non-military
objects.10 As JeffreyWalker has argued in relation to cyberwars:
Because the entire law of war regime has been built upon a Westphalian foundation,
the transformative properties of cyber warfare are just as breathtaking. We are left
pondering some fundamental questions . . . the international legal regime is lagging
far behind the problems presented by the increasingly sophisticated technological
possibilities in this area.11
Bringing such potentially disruptive elements under existing legal categories re-
quires a speciﬁc expertise; the knowledge, skills, and imagination of those who are
trained and experienced in speciﬁc legal ﬁelds.
In this article, we reconstruct the role and function of expertise in the case of
cybersecurity. This is not a paper on cybersecurity itself, and we do not seek to
advance the lawof cybersecurity, to demand speciﬁc countermeasures, or to develop
policy proposals. Rather, we use cybersecurity as an example to reconstruct: (i) how
expertise and law are co-constituted in this area by making use of the concepts
of uncertainty and risk; (ii) how expert commissions in international law claim
authority to articulate the law (and how, if successful, such claims also create new
institutional legal facts); (iii)howtheuseofexpertise inconﬂictandsecurity lawmay
produce new uncertainties or solidify existing doubts regarding the applicability of
international law.
Wewill substantiate our argument bymeans of a study of the latest expert report
in the ﬁeld of international security: the TallinnManual on Cyberwarfare (hereafter
the Tallinn Manual). The Tallinn Manual is a good example of the way in which
8 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later’, (2010) 20(1) European Journal of Inter-
national Law 7.
9 For a broader analysis seeW. G.Werner, ‘The Politics of Expertise: Applying Paradoxes of Scientiﬁc Expertise
to International Law’, in E. Hey (ed.), The Role of Experts in International Decision Making (2013, forthcoming).
10 W. G. Werner, ‘The Changing Face of Enmity: Carl Schmitt’s International Theory and the Evolution of the
Legal Concept ofWar’, (2010) 2(3) International Theory 351.
11 J. K.Walker, ‘TheDemise of theNation-State, theDawnofNewParadigmWarfare, and a Future for the Profes-
sionofArms’, (2001)51AirForceLawReview323.Quoted inR.Huges, ‘TowardsaGlobalRegime forCyberWar-
fare’, available at www.ccdcoe.org/publications/virtualbattleﬁeld/07_HUGHES%20Cyber%20Regime.pdf
(accessed 18 December 2012).
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legal expertise is mobilized in the ﬁeld of international security. Just like other
expert committees in the ﬁeld, the Tallinn group of experts claims authority on
the basis of two different counts: impersonal legal sources and the expertise of the
speciﬁc persons involved in the project. And just like other expert committees in
the ﬁeld of international security, the Tallinn group is called upon to articulate
existing rules of international law in the face of developments that challenge the
state-centric foundations of international law. An analysis of the way in which the
TallinnManual seeks to absorbuncertainty through legal expertise can thusprovide
useful insights for critical research into the workings of other expert committees in
international conﬂict and security law as well.
In our ﬁrst section we relate our article to the core topic of this symposium: the
co-constitution of legal expertise and its objects. In particular, we will focus on the
way in which the securitization of cyberspace has set the stage for speciﬁc legal
questions and the mobilization of a speciﬁc legal expertise. Subsequently, we will
discuss how the Tallinn Manual seeks to absorb these uncertainties by recourse to
expert knowledge.12 We will focus on one crucial uncertainty surrounding one of
the cornerstones of the UNCharter, the prohibition on the use of force: is it possible
to regard cyberoperations as uses of force prohibited by international law? Our
article examines how the Tallinn Manual deals with this question. The aim of this
examination is not to assess the quality of the Manual or to discuss whether the
Manual has provided the right answers to questions pertaining to the use of force.
Rather, the Manual functions as a case study to highlight some aspects of the role
and function of expertise in international law, with a speciﬁc focus on one part of
the report, dealing with the use of force.
2. THE CO-CONSTITUTION OF LEGAL EXPERTISE AND CYBERWAR
2.1. Expertise and the politics of international law
The politics of international law today, Martti Koskenniemi wrote some three years
ago, is ‘often a politics of re-deﬁnition, that is to say, the strategic deﬁnition of a
situation or a problem by reference to a technical idiom so as to open the door for
applying the expertise related to that idiom, together with the attendant structural
bias’.13 The Tallinn Manual on Cyberwarfare provides a good example of Kosken-
niemi’s point. The projectwas initiated byNATO, chaired by a professor from theUS
Naval College, and carried out by a group of experts in military affairs and conﬂict
and security law. Not surprisingly, the Manual exclusively deals with cybermatters
in terms of applicable jus ad bellum and jus in bello, taking the reader through an end-
less list of possible topics that could potentially be relevant for the legal assessment
12 On a more social theoretical level, we thus argue that uncertainty reduction goes hand in hand with
uncertainty production. One cannot have one without the other. What the manual does, however, is to
transform unstructured into structured uncertainty, and thereby stabilize the meaning and applicability of
the legal vocabulary (and imagination). The source of uncertainty is related to theuncertainties generated by
cyberspace, which are framed in terms of risks. The TallinnManual reduces these uncertainties by invoking
the legal vocabulary centered around norms. The ‘structured’ uncertainties result from the conﬂicts arising
from bringing risks under the heading of norms.
13 See Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at 11.
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of cyberwar, including what look like slightly exotic topics such as the protection
of medical and religious personnel, leve´e en masse (making the reader wonder what
that would look like in cyberspace . . . ) or the abuse of the UN emblem.14
While the list of topics studied under the rubric of conﬂict and security law is
lengthy indeed, the report is of course also limited in that it focuses on those areas of
law that are of speciﬁc interest for NATO (thus leaving aside other possibly relevant
areas such as human rights, lex digitalis, criminal law, or international economic
law). The framing of cyberspace in terms of conﬂict and security law is partly the
result of a longer-term process wherein states and international organizations have
focused on (potential) threats that emanate from the world of cyber. At the same
time, discussing problems in cyberspace through the lens of conﬂict and security
law reconstitutes the very nature of the topics under consideration. Cyberopera-
tions become ‘uses of force’, ‘self-defence operations’, ‘aggression’, or ‘armed attacks’
while agents are reconstituted as ‘combatants’ and ‘civilians’. The Tallinn Manual
is thereby also exemplary of the central topic for this symposium as identiﬁed by
the editors’ introduction, the co-constitution of legal expertise and their objects.
Rather than standing ‘in-between the production and application of knowledge’ as
a well-known deﬁnition of expertise would have it,15 legal experts are products and
co-producers of their object of study and advice.16 As a result, the Tallinn Manual
can be read in twoways. First, as the product of a longer trend inwhich the object of
‘cyber’ is phrased and constituted in terms of ‘uncertain threats’ to which military
responses could (or should) be considered (section 2.2 below). In this sense, the so-
cially constructed object of cybersecurity constitutes speciﬁc groups of individuals
as experts. Second, as an attempt to absorb the uncertainties surrounding cyber-
war through legal reasoning and the application of rules (section 2.3), an attempt
that, as we will show in section 3, paradoxically solidiﬁes some of the uncertainties
surrounding the application of existing law to cyberwar.
2.2. Uncertainties of cyberspace
In order to obtain a sense of the social construction of cyberspace as an area of
insecurity and unpredictability,17 it is useful to remember that cybersecurity has a
history that goes back at least to the mid-1970s, when distant access for entering
programs and data became possible and when cybersecurity already became part
of the US national security agenda.18 In its over-35-year history, the debate and
14 See TallinnManual, respectively, under Rules 70–3, 27, and 63.
15 N. Grundmann and R. Stehr, Experts: The Knowledge and Power of Expertise (2011), at 40, describing experts as
‘mediators between producers of knowledge and users of knowledge; and thus, between those who create
the capacity to take action and those whose task it is to act’.
16 In other words, the co-constitution of expertise and ﬁeld of study runs through the stabilization of imagina-
tions.
17 The objective of this section is neither to provide a complete overview of the history of cybersecurity, nor to
provide a comprehensive account of all aspects of cybersecurity. This section simply reconstructs the extent
to which transformative dynamics associated with cybersecurity trespass traditional legal conﬁnes and at
the same time calls for ‘new’ legal expertise.
18 M. Dunn Cavelty, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age (2008), at 45, 54,
andM. Dunn Cavelty, ‘From Cyber-Bombs to Political Fallout: Threat Representations with an Impact in the
Cyber-Security Discourse’, (2013) International Studies Review 15(1), at 109.
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dominant images have shifted.19 We do not want to reiterate the history of cyberse-
curity itself, but rather point to three distinct sources of uncertainty: (i) the blurring
of previously believed solid distinctions like public and private; inside and outside;
(ii) the (alleged) novelty of cyberthreats, including the difﬁculties in attributing
them to actors; and the (iii) lack of historical experience and reliance on analogies
andmetaphors.20
First, cyberthreats trespass the classic conﬁnes of public international law. For
example, in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the debate on
cybersecurity in the USmoved from the hackers and foreign intelligence to critical
infrastructure. In the aftermath of the bombing, President Clinton set up the Presi-
dential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection that presented its results
in 1997 and made clear that modern societies depend on the functioning of critical
infrastructures like electricity, telecommunication, or ﬁnancial services. Its report
on ‘Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructure’21 opened by making
clear that:
Our national defense, economic prosperity, and quality of life have long depended on
the essential services that underpin our society. These critical infrastructures – energy,
banking and ﬁnance, transportation, vital human services, and telecommunications –
must be viewed in a new context in the Information Age. The rapid proliferation and
integration of telecommunications and computer systems have connected infrastruc-
tures to one another in a complex network of interdependence. This interlinkage has
created a new dimension of vulnerability, which, when combined with an emerging
constellation of threats, poses unprecedented national risk.22
Critical infrastructure protection showed that threats do not ﬁt into traditional
categories such as the distinction of private/public, as the providers of those in-
frastructures now ﬁnd themselves to be part of a security discourse. The classic
distinction between public and private actors consequently gets blurred when, for
example, energy providers ﬁnd themselves to be part of a security discourse. In addi-
tion, critical infrastructure protection shows that contemporary threats are linked
to the very characteristics of the infrastructures over which the state does not have
complete control. Apart from the necessary inclusion of other actors in the security
discourse, these security threats do not emanate from ‘outside’ one’s own territory.
This means that the classic distinction between inside and outside upon which
19 See Dunn Cavelty (2008), supra note 18, for a detailed discussion.
20 The reason for focusing on these three uncertainties – without neglecting other sources or understandings
of uncertainties – relates to the fact that all these three sources of uncertainty make a classic use of the law
of war problematic.
21 The report is available at www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/docs/PCCIP%20Report%201997.pdf. For a discussion on
critical infrastructure, see G. Giacomello, ‘Bangs for the Buck: A Cost–Beneﬁt Analysis of Cyberterrorism’,
(2004) 27(5) Studies in Conﬂict and Terrorism 387; G. Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New
Challenges (2006).M.DunnCavelty andK. SobyKristensen (eds.),Securing theHomeland: Critical Infrastructure,
Risk, and (In)Security (2007).
22 US President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997, available at www.cyber.
st.dhs.gov/docs/PCCIP%20Report%201997.pdf, at ix.
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classic legal categories are based is called into question.23 As an answer to these
uncertainties, the report called for proactive measures, as:
while we see no electronic disaster around the corner, this is no basis for complacency.
We did ﬁnd widespread capability to exploit infrastructure vulnerabilities. The cap-
ability to do harm – particularly through information networks – is real; it is growing
at an alarming rate; and we have little defense against it.24
The second source of uncertainty relates to the difﬁculties of identifying the
agents responsible for cyberattacks (or what were sometimes called acts of ‘cyber-
terrorism’).25 This can be illustrated by the classical examples of Estonia (2007)
and Georgia (2008)26, Iran (2010), or the Red October virus. In all these cases there
was not only doubt as to whether the attacks constituted examples of espionage,
intervention, the use of force, or an armed attack in the legal sense; there were
also questions whether the attacks could be (legally) attributed to an identiﬁable
agent.27
After Estonian ofﬁcials decided to relocate a memorial of the Soviet libera-
tion from the Nazis, a cyberattack paralysed the entire Estonian infrastructure on
30 April. Additionally, many ofﬁcial Internet sites became temporally unavailable
(a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack). There were strong indications that
the attack originated from Russia, but there was no solid proof of the source of
the attacks.28 Additionally, during the Georgian war in 2008, several DDoS attacks
23 For a longer discussion, see S. J. Collier and A. Lakoff, ‘The Vulnerability of Vital Systems:
How “Critical Infrastructure” Became a Security Problem’, in Dunn Cavelty and Soby Kristensen,
supra note 21. See also G. L. Herrera, ‘The Politics of Bandwidth: International Political Im-
plications of a Global Digital Information Network’, 2002 28(1) Review of International Stud-
ies 93; see also www.blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2011/9/20/4903371.html?utm_source=
feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A±IGPBlog±%28IGP±Blog±Main%29.
24 See President’s Report, supra note 22, at 34.
25 Soon after the President’s Report in 1997, the word ‘cyberterrorism’ was introduced and gained widespread
attentionwith the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001. See DunnCavelty, supra note 18, 101. The idea that
terrorist groups could use the cyberspace to launch an attack from anywhere in the world (including from
within the US itself) was not too far away from what has happened on 9/11. Even though, as Dunn Cavelty
argues, the Bush Administration actually followed Clinton’s frames, the US The Uniting and Strengthening
AmericabyProvidingAppropriateToolsRequiredtoInterceptandObstructTerrorismActexpandedtherange
of cyberterrorism extensively: what was previously treated as cybercrime could now easily be reinterpreted
as acts of terrorism.
26 See inparticularR.Deibert, J.Rohozinski, andM.Crete-Nishihata, ‘Cyclones inCyberspace: InformationShap-
ingandDenial in the2008Russia–GeorgiaWar’, (2012) 43(3)SecurityDialogues3.Theypointout that theC&C
servers responsible were located on Russian territory, but appear to originate from a private company. Also,
see J. Bumgarner and S. Borg, ‘Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber Campaign against Georgia in
August 2008’, available at www.registan.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/US-CCU-Georgia-Cyber-
Campaign-Overview.pdf. See also www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/shadow-wars-debating-cyber-
disarmament.
27 See for example www.erratasec.blogspot.de/2012/09/there-was-no-georgia-cyber-war.html (last accessed on
13 May 2013). The point here is not to call into question the existence of DDoS attacks or to deny Russia’s
involvement, but to simply point out that attribution is difﬁcult if, for example, a government-owned
computer can be ‘hijacked’ by a hacker and manipulated. There is simply uncertainty around who is to be
held responsible for an attack and under what conditions it can be attributed to a state.
28 Given the tensions between Estonia and Russia right before the attack, Russia was accused of standing
behind these attacks. See www.spiegel.de/international/world/old-wars-and-new-estonians-accuse-kremlin-
of-cyberwarfare-a-483394.html (last accessed on 13May 2013). Eventually a 20-year-old studentwas thought
to be responsible for the attack. The fact that Estonia is part of NATOmight explainwhyNATOhas a speciﬁc
interest in clarifying the status of ‘cyberwar’ for its own Art. 5.
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on Georgian websites were reported; again there were indications but no deﬁn-
ite proof that a state-sponsored agent was responsible for the attack. The debate
shifted considerably with the discovery of Stuxnet in June 2010. Stuxnet was a
wormthatwas initially targetedat Siemens supervisory control anddata acquisition
systems (STADA) and was employed to sabotage the Iranian nuclear programme.
Rumour suggested that US and Israeli intelligence were behind this attack.29 Yet
rumours and articles in mass media are not considered evidence in the legal sense.
Again, it proved hard to trace down the origin of a virus. And even if the originator is
found, it could be a private company or a speciﬁc individual, with all the problems
that arise in terms of attribution and state responsibility under international law.30
A third example is the debate surrounding the virus called ‘Red October’.31 Red
Octoberwasactive foroverﬁveyears, operational inover60countries, andable toex-
tract classiﬁed information.32 It used computers andmobile phones fromembassies,
government agencies, multinational corporations, nuclear and military sites, and
research centres around the globe.33 The virus traced data that was encrypted with
speciﬁc codes (like Acid Cryptoﬁler, which is used by the EU and NATO) and was
controlled by a chain of over 60 so-called command-and-control (C&C) servers. This
chain makes it, given current knowledge, impossible to trace down the origin of
the virus, or to identify its mastermind. It was unclear what the virus tried to do,
what the information was for, and who wanted to accomplish what with the virus.
If cyberspace allows for newways to hide or even erase origins, then thismakes any
simple ‘translation’ into the legal vocabulary of ‘attribution’ virtually impossible.
The third source of uncertainty relates to the lack of historical experience: there
is a widespread consensus in the literature that – Stuxnet notwithstanding – there
simply has been no incident of a cyberwar that inﬂicted thewidespread devastation
and damage usually associated with ‘war’. If we associate war with severe damage
and a signiﬁcant number of dead bodies, then this has simply not yet happened.
Of course, the Georgian war was ﬂanked by cyber attacks, but the cyber attacks
themselves did not create severe enoughdamage to legitimize theuse of the concept
of ‘war’. 34 Assessing the legality of responses to cyber attacks thus remains to a large
extent amatter of speculation and hypothetical reasoning. In this context it is quite
telling that imminence and urgency are created through analogies like ‘electronic
Pearl Harbor’ and not through historical reconstructions. The Tallinn Manual also
29 See www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last accessed 10May 2013).
30 As Deibert, Rohozinski, and Crete-Nishihata, supra note 26, point out, cyberspace is now considered equally
important as ‘traditional’ areas of land, air, sea, and space. At the time of writing, there are news reports that
the US army has quadrupled its cybersecurity capacity.
31 See www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/9800946/Red-October-computer-virus-found.html (accessed 10
May 2013). Even though Red October is more a case of cyberespionage than cyberwar, it highlights the
difﬁculties of attribution.
32 Because the virus remained undetected for years and used new techniques that made it ‘silent’ (at least
for common antivirus alert systems), experts labelled the new virus ‘Red October’, in memory of the USSR
submarine in the Hollywoodmovie.
33 For a map of infected countries, see www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/how-russian-virus-hunters-
tracked-down-a-global-espionage-network-a-879467.html.
34 Rule 13, para. 13.
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attests to this by pointing out that ‘no international cyber incidents have, as of 2012,
been unambiguously and publicly characterized by the international community
as reaching the threshold of an armed attack’. Yet although a cyberwar appears to
be unlikely – given the necessary means and the expected damage it could produce
– cybersecurity is meanwhile regarded to be as important as other areas of security.
In this context it is important to note that issues of cyberspace are increasingly
discussed in terms of a ‘preventive logic’. 35
2.3. Uncertainty and legalization
With the imaginaries of cyberspace in termsofdanger, risk, anduncertainty inplace,
the framing of the issues relating to cyberspace in the TallinnManual did not come
as a surprise.36 The experts had to apply existing law to an object that had already
been imagined in terms of unpredictability and danger for more than a decade. In
that sense it was the object that to a large degree determined the applicable law: if
analogies canbedrawntoPearlHarbor, it becomesalmost amatterof course toassess
cyberspace in terms of conﬂict and security law. In addition, questions regarding the
applicability of international law to the phenomenon of cyberspace had been raised
repeatedly:was itpossible to frame the issueof cyberwar inestablished terms suchas
‘state responsibility’, ‘use of force’, ‘armed attack’, ‘military object’, and ‘combatant’?
In this sense the Tallinn Manual can be seen as an attempt to deﬁne and constitute
the object in terms of the legal expertise involved.
However, there is by deﬁnition a tension between framing issues in terms of
danger, threats, and insecurity, andattempts todeﬁneobjects in termsofpre-existing
rules and principles. A successful presentation of cyberspace as a realm of insecur-
ity, uncertainty, and threats to critical infrastructure almost naturally comes with
resistance to a legalistic ethos that seeks to subject political decision-making to
general and pre-given rules.37 The logic of uncertainty and prevention that charac-
terizes many security policies on cyberspace sits uncomfortably with the idea that
decision-making should be based on pre-existing legal norms and principles.38 The
logic of legalism, by contrast, is one of recourse to a system of rules ‘out there’ that
can be applied tomatters at hand.39 A legalistic approach attempts to deﬁnematters
as subject to the normal operation of rules: although sometimes the creativity of
legal minds is called for, it is possible to deﬁne the world in terms of the pre-given
35 Even though we generally agree with Dunn Cavelty (2008) that the history of cybersecurity is a history of
failed securitizationmoves and can rather beunderstood in termsof ‘threat politics’, this contributiondiffers
from the literature on securitization, critical infrastructure, or threat politics insofar as it is interested in the
constitution of legal expertise and not the security experts. However, we do agree that the representation of
the ‘object’ is crucial to understanding the kind of knowledge claims put forward and the form of legitimate
expertise.
36 Even though we talk about (existential) threat here, we do not follow the securitization approach. For a
discussion see L. Hansen and H. Nissenbaum, ‘Digital Disater, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School’,
(2009) 53 International Studies Quarterly 1155.
37 For an excellent discussion of legalism as the ethos of the legal profession see J. Shklar, Legalism (1964). We
also thank a reviewer for pointing out the conﬂict between successful securitization and legalization.
38 For an interesting juxtaposition of the logics of risk and legal responsibility see F. Ewald, L’e´tat providence
(1986).
39 See Shklar, supra note 37.
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standards, rules, and principles that law provides. The Tallinn Manual operates
within this tension, with an object that for over a decade has been deﬁned as poten-
tially dangerous, irregular, and requiring action based on a logic of prevention and
risk; and at the same time the ambition to apply pre-given rules of positive conﬂict
and security law. The text takes the reader through all the well-established known
categories of the UN Charter and humanitarian law, making admirable efforts to
apply thenormalcy of law to the irregularity of dangers emanating fromcyberspace.
Seen in this light, the ambition of the Manual is almost breathtaking. In the words
of the chairman of the Tallinn group of experts, Michael Schmitt, the idea behind
the Tallinn Manual was not ‘to bring a bunch of lawyers together . . . who appear
to impress the audience by telling how truly hard cyber is’.40 What about, Schmitts
wonders, ‘if we start answering the questions?’41 In other words: the idea behind
theManual was answering questions that the newly constituted object of cyberwar
produced, in terms of positive international law. Below we will turn to the way in
which the group of experts asserted its own authority to tackle the ambitious task
of deﬁning cyberwar in terms of existing international law.
3. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EXPERTISE AND UNCERTAINTY
REDUCTION
3.1. The question of authority and the composition of the expert group
The use of expert knowledge is generally meant to provide a speciﬁc form of legit-
imacy or authority for certain interpretations, decisions, or arguments (or, of course,
to undermine their authority). The legitimacy bonus of expert knowledge is derived
from two somewhat contradictory elements. On the one hand, expert knowledge
consists of an impersonal validity claim; for expert knowledge to work, it should
present itself as independent of the personal preferences of the expert in question.
If an expert fails to convince an audience that the knowledge she produces is inde-
pendent of her personal likes or dislikes, her claim to expertise will most likely fail.
On the other hand, the power of expert knowledge is rooted in the speciﬁc position
and reputation of the expert in question.42 It is not just any personmaking a validity
claim; it is persons who have speciﬁc skills, knowledge, and experience who make
the claim. In this sense it matters a great deal whether one person or the other is
attempting to produce expert knowledge.
40 Thequotes are taken fromapresentationbyMichael Schmitt on theTallinnManualCyCon2012.M. Schmitt,
‘TallinnManual Part I’, posted at youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wY3uEo-Itso (0:40).
41 See supra note 40, at (0:50).
42 This raises the question how disciplinary knowledge – and the boundaries it sets – constitute certain power
relations andmake expertise possible. Apart fromquestions of representation and legitimation (who elected
the bankers? Or the lawyers?), this constitutes also a ﬁght between these disciplines over issue areas, a
problem we cannot deal with in further detail at this point. However, it does raise the question through
which practices, concepts, and images ‘law’ allows for certain ‘experts’, and how these experts have to relate
to law in a speciﬁc way to count as experts. This boundary then also sets the boundary of critique – because
not every critiquewill be taken into consideration. SeeO.Kessler, ‘Beyond Sectors, Before theWorld: Finance,
Security, and Risk’, (2011) 42(2) Security Dialogue, 197.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 23 Dec 2013 IP address: 130.37.129.78
EXPERTISE, UNCERTAINTY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 803
The ambiguous basis of expert knowledge is also visible in the Tallinn manual.
TheManual takesgreatpains tosetout that it isnotmeant torepresent thepositionof
statesorinternationalorganizationsonthelawapplicabletocyberwar. Instead, itsets
out toexplicate existing internationaldeﬁnitions, rules, andprinciplesof lawas they
canbe found inestablished sources of international law.The longand impressive list
of legal sources andauthorities included in theverybeginningof the report attests to
this. Although theManual acknowledges that different interpretations are possible
(and openly discusses differences of opinions throughout the report), its claim to
validity is thus based on pre-given sources such as treaties and customary law.43 The
claim of the report, in other words, is that anyone following the proper methods of
international lawwouldcometo (moreor less) thesameresults.At thesametime, the
report cannot but acknowledge that it has speciﬁc origins as well as a geographical
bias. In addition to the international legal sources that allegedly enjoy validity for
all states, the report heavily draws on the military manuals of four states (Canada,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States), because ‘the international
community generally considers these four manuals to be especially useful during
legal research and analysis with respect to conﬂict issues’.44 The wording is chosen
carefully in order to prevent the manuals of four NATO states being put on a par
with primary legal sources that bind all states alike: the manuals are considered
‘especially useful’, not a direct source of authority. Yet, the way in which primary
legal sources are to be read and applied in context can be inferred from the four
manuals, because ‘the international community’ apparently ﬁnds them useful in
legal research and analysis. In this way, the four manuals are injected with global
authority that transcends their geographical, political, and cultural boundaries.
Given the history of the laws of armed conﬂict international law (and inter-
national law in general), it is somewhat remarkable to see that the Manual moves
seemingly smoothly from the opinions of a fewWestern states to the ‘international
community’ as awhole. AsMegret has noted, international humanitarian law today
is still closely tied to nineteenth-century, Western images of legitimate statehood
and the corresponding understandings of international law’s nature and function.
Whereas most international lawyers will see the function of humanitarian law
primarily as regulating warfare, ‘the realist, the underdog or the anti-colonialist
might well all tell a different story, one in which the role of the laws of war is
above all to reinforce the state’s unshakeable stranglehold andexpress thedominant
consensus about the state’s incontrovertible legitimacy’.45 Now it would certainly
be far-fetched and unfair to label the Tallinn Manual a product of neo-colonialism.
However, it is interesting to note that it does encounter problems that are not
dissimilar to the ones raised in postcolonial scholarship.46 The close ties between
conceptions of statehood that prevailed in thenineteenth century and international
43 See supra note 26.
44 See supra note 26, at 21.
45 F. Megret, ‘From Savages to Unlawful Combatants: A Postcolonial Look at International Law’s
“Other”’, in A. Orford, International Law and Its Others, 265, also available at http://people.
mcgill.ca/ﬁles/frederic.megret/Megret-SavagesandtheLawsofWar.pdf, at 29.
46 Ibid.
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law’s understanding of war alsomake it difﬁcult tomake sense of operations taking
place in and through cyberspace, operations that are increasingly portrayed as
trespassing established legal boundaries.
However, the report does not only ground its validity claims in legal sources. It
also invokes the speciﬁc position and reputation of the experts involved in order to
convince the audience.47 Take, for example, the way in which the report grounds
its conclusions regarding the validity and scope of customary international law:
‘Ultimately, the professional knowledge, experience, and expertise of the Experts
form the basis for the Tallinn Manual’s conclusions as to the customary status of a
Rule or its extension into non-international armed conﬂict’.48 The authority of the
report is thus grounded not only in sources of international law, but also in the trust
we should have in the professional knowledge, expertise, and experience of Experts
(with capital E). The report explicitly underlines this by stating that the group of
experts is composed of experienced practitioners, ‘world-class expert’ academics,
and technical experts: a mix that ‘is crucial to the credibility of the ﬁnal product’.49
In this context it is important to underline the way in which the experts were
selected. The process started with an invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber De-
fense Center of Excellence to Michael Schmitt, asking him to put together a group
of experts that could start answering questions regarding the applicability of inter-
national law to matters of cyberwar. As such, the fact that Michael Schmitt was in-
vited tochair thegroupofexperts for theNATOCenter isnotverysurprising.Schmitt
had acted as a member of expert committees before,50 is chair of the international-
law department at the US Naval War College, and is the author of some innovative
and widely quoted articles on cyberwarfare.51 Schmitt’s earlier work on cyberwar
– and on international humanitarian law in general – combined two elements that
ﬁtted the idea of amanual on the applicability of international law to cyberwar par-
ticularly well. First, Schmitt had repeatedly argued that existing international law
covers newdevelopments inmilitary technology, although the application of law to
newproblemsmay require the craftsmanship and creativity of professional lawyers.
According to Schmitt, issues such as drone warfare or cyberwar do not take place
in a legal vacuum but in a pre-existing system of rules whose exact meaning can
be established through legal interpretation.52 What is needed, therefore, is not the
adoption of new legal instruments (as some have argued) but the (re)interpretation
47 This audience encompasses policymakers and security experts but also the discipline of ‘international law’.
Hence ‘audience’ in our understanding relates to the problem of ‘the public’.
48 Ibid., at 20–1.
49 Ibid., at 22.
50 Schmitt was one of the experts that took part in the deliberations on the ICRC study on civilians directly
participating in hostilities. Schmitt, however, was one of the experts that disagreed so fundamentally with
the propositions contained in the ICRC’s Interpretative Guidance that he asked to delete his name as one
of the participants. Schmitt basically disagreed with the way in which the ICRC study struck the balance
between humanity andmilitary necessity.
51 The debate on the legal aspects of cyberwar took off afterM. Schmitt, ‘ComputerNetworkAttacks: Thoughts
on a Normative Framework’, (1999) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 37, 885.
52 ‘Yet, cyberspace is not a lawless ﬁrmament. As with the aforementioned weapons, the established norms . . .
govern their use’, in M. Schmitt, ‘Cyberspace and International Law: The Penumbral Mist of Uncertainty’,
(2013)Harvard Law Journal 126, 176–89, at 176.
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of the international legal framework already in place. Or, as Schmitt has put it in an
interview with ABC News: ‘Let’s be honest. Everyone has treated the Internet as a
sort of WildWest, a lawless zone. But international law has to be just as applicable
to online weapons as conventional weapons’.53 Second, his work is based on the
(widely shared) assumption that international law is ultimately made, applied, and
enforced by states.54 This statement is echoed in the Manual’s repeated assurances
that the experts bynomeans createnewrules of international law, but only state and
clarify what states had already agreed on. More speciﬁcally, Schmitt had taken the
position that international humanitarian law ‘must remain sensitive to the interest
of states in conducting warfare efﬁciently’; a position that made it more likely that
his chairmanship would prevent the adoption of guidelines that were far removed
from the will and interests of the NATO states.55
The invitation toSchmitt camewithablankcheque:hewasgivenasmuchmoney
as he needed and complete freedom to design his own group of experts.56 Therewill
be fewpeople doubting that the group that Schmitt eventually composed contained
highly competent lawyers, technical experts, and practitioners. At the same time,
however, the group reﬂects a geographical bias57 and does not include critics of
the positions earlier adopted by the chair. The Manual itself also remains silent
about the criteria thatwere used to select themost relevant ‘professionals, technical
experts and world class academics’. Given the relatively underdeveloped nature of
the international legal discipline in termsof journal rankingand impact assessment,
it is probably virtually impossible to set any ﬁxed criteria for who counts as world-
class academics and who allegedly operates at a different level. Yet, the selection
of experts is very important in light of the statement that the group of experts has
sought to ‘capture all reasonable positions for inclusion in the Tallinn Manual’s
Commentary’.58 The implicit argument that is made here is that legal positions not
mentioned in the Manual are apparently ‘unreasonable’ in the eyes of the experts.
Anyone who would like to bring such ‘unreasonable’ arguments to the fore will
have to argue against the authority of the assembled experienced practitioners,
‘world-class expert’ academics and technical experts.
The mere fact that an internationally constituted group of experts manages to
present consensus on some legal issues is likely to be taken up as a powerful signal
in the popular press, in academia, and in political circles. In the case of the Tallinn
Manual, its ﬁndings were presented in the media as a ‘new doctrine’ with possibly
53 Available at www.abcnews.go.com/International/arming-virtual-battle-dangerous-rules-cyberwar/story?
id=18888675&page=2.
54 M. Schmitt, ‘The Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical
Analysis’, (2010) 1Harvard National Security Journal 5, at 7.
55 Ibid., at 6. Note that Schmitt’s reliance on international law as a pre-existing system and his assumption
that international law stems from the will and interests of states reﬂects the mainstream international law
position identiﬁed by M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (2005). This raises again questions about
attribution in the context of cybersecurity.
56 See supra note 40, at (1:10).
57 On this point see infra, p. 803.
58 See supra 26, at 20.
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dangerous implications,59 as an ‘attempt at codiﬁcation’ and a ‘handbook’,60 as
‘the likely key reference’ when states would decide to adopt rules for conﬂict in
cyberspace,61 or as ‘in short . . . the new rules of war for a new type of war’.62 In
addition, the Manual was embraced by one of NATO’s legal assistants as ‘the most
important document in the law of cyber-warfare’.63 While it is too early to tell how
theManualwillorwillnotaffect thepositionofstates, it is interestingtonote that the
chair of the expert groups has alreadymade an attempt to portray the ﬁndings of the
TallinnManual as basically reﬂecting the opinio juris expressed by the United States.
According toSchmitt, the opinio jurisof theUScouldbededuced fromapublic speech
on international law and cyberspace by US State Department Legal Advisor Harold
Koh.64 The congruence between the US position and the Tallinn Manual, Schmitt
argues, ‘is striking. This conﬂuence of a state’s expression of opinio juriswith a work
constituting “the teachings of the most highly qualiﬁed publicists of the various
nations” signiﬁcantly enhances the persuasiveness of common conclusions’.65
Now, as may be expected, the experts did not reach consensus on all legal issues,
and, in particular, not on some foundational questions of jus ad bellum and jus
in bello. Given the potential impact of the Manual it is important to study the
possible consequences of such a failure among experts to produce consensus on
the application and interpretation of rules. As has been observed in relation to
scientiﬁcexpertise,alackofconsensuscaneventuallybedetrimentaltotheauthority
claims put forward by experts and expert committees.66 In this context, it is possible
to identify at least two different ways in which experts can fail to produce clear
consensus on the scope and interpretation of rules.
In the ﬁrst place, expert reports can produce ‘ofﬁcially notiﬁed disagreement’
in cases where experts have irreconcilable views on the best way to read particu-
lar provisions. When experts disagree on the reading of a rule, this sends a signal
to legal and political communities that experienced and knowledgeable experts
acknowledge that different and maybe even contradictory interpretations are all
reasonable.While this reduces complexity because not all positions are recognized
as acceptable, it also ofﬁcially stamps the existence of uncertainty surrounding
59 See ABC News, ‘Arming for Virtual Battle: The Dangerous New Rules of Cyberwar’, 7 April
2013, at www.abcnews.go.com/International/arming-virtual-battle-dangerous-rules-cyberwar/story?id=
18888675&page=3.
60 See ‘Rules of Cyberwar: Don’t Target Nuclear Plants or Hospitals, Says Nato Manual’, Guardian, 18 March
2013, available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/18/rules-cyberwarfare-nato-manual.
61 M. Mimoso, Tallinn Manual Interprets International Law in Cyberwar Context (25 March 2013), available at
www.threatpost.com/tallinn-manual-interprets-international-law-cyberwar-context-032513.
62 ‘NATO Publishes a How-toManual for CyberWarfare’ (19March 2013), available at www.digitaltrends.com/
cool-tech/natos-cyberwar-rules-leave-the-civilians-out-of-it.
63 Statement by Colonel Kirby Abbott, assistant legal adviser at Nato, in ‘Rules of Cyberwar’ supra note 60.
64 H. Koh, ‘International Law in Cyberspace’,USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (18 September 2012),
available at www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm. According to Schmitt, ‘since the speech had
been fully cleared in the inter-agency process, it can be viewed as expressing the US government views on
the issues’. M. Schmitt, ‘International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed’,
(2012) 54Harvard Law Journal 13, at 14.
65 See Schmitt, ibid., at 15.
66 In relation to scientiﬁc expertise this point was made by, inter alia, Ulrich Beck, ‘a different computer, a
different specialist, a different institute – a different “reality”. It would be amiracle if it did not already exist,
a miracle and not science’. See U. Beck, Risk Society (1992), at 166.
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international legal rules. Anyonenowclaiming that (s)he knowswith certainty that
a rule shouldbe applied in aparticularway, canbe confrontedwith the existenceof a
lackof consensusbetween reputable experts on theapplicationof thevery same rule
(‘who are you to claim that youknowbetter than the expertswho could not agree?’).
In this context, it is interesting to note that the Tallinn Manual also critiques the
ICRC expert study on direct participation in hostilities, with some experts arguing
that the ICRC interpretation of what constitutes ‘direct’ participation ‘makes little
operational sense’.67 Alsowithin theManual itself, opposingviewsarepresented, for
example, when it comes to fundamental issues such as the applicability of the laws
of armed conﬂict. As the Manual makes clear, experts disagree on the conditions of
applicabilityof the lawsofarmedconﬂict andcouldnot reachconsensusonthequal-
iﬁcation of the Stuxnet attack against Iran in 2010.68 Similarly, theManual ofﬁcially
presents disagreement between experts on the deﬁnition of an armed conﬂict,69 the
territorial limitations to the laws of armed conﬂict,70 and the distinction between
international and non-international armed conﬂicts.71
Second, experts can reach consensus that a rule is too underdetermined to draw
any deﬁnite conclusions regarding its concrete application. Such an ofﬁcial presen-
tation of underdeterminacy weakens the position of anyone claiming that the rule
shouldbe read and applied in aparticular fashion. Below,wewill give onemore elab-
orate example of theway inwhich the TallinnManual ofﬁcially stamps uncertainty
regarding international legal rules: the interpretation of the prohibition on the use
of force (section 3.2). The prohibition on the use of force is generally considered as
one of the cornerstones of the UN framework, and of post-1945 international law in
general.72 At the same time, the precise meaning and scope of Article 2(4) remains
unclear and subject to much controversy. The Tallinn experts were thus called to
apply an undetermined, yet pivotal, provision of international law to the ﬁeld of
cyberspace.
3.2. Use of force
One of the core questions in relation to cyberattacks is whether – and under what
conditions – they can qualify as ‘uses of force’ as prohibited byArticle 2(4) of theUN
Charterandinternationalcustomary law.Fromtheoutset, theTallinnManualmakes
clear that the capacity to deal with cyberattacks via Article 2(4) is limited, since the
prohibition on the use of force is directed to states only. Cyberattacks by non-state
groups are therefore beyond the scope of this prohibition, unless they can be attrib-
uted to a state.73 However, even if it were possible to attribute a cyberoperation to a
state, itwould still bedifﬁcult todeterminewhether this operationactually qualiﬁes
67 Rule 35, under 10. Note that this critique reﬂects the position of Michael Schmitt who initially participated
and eventuallywithdrew from the ICRCproject precisely because it failed to strike a proper balance between
humanity andmilitary necessity. See supra note 1.
68 Rule 22, under 12–14, see also section 2.2 above
69 Rule 20, under 5.
70 Rule 21, under 3.
71 Rule 22, under 9; Rule 23, under 3
72 B. Simma et al., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2002).
73 Rule 10, under 5.
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as ‘force’ under Article 2(4). Absent a deﬁnition of ‘force’ in international law, those
who are bound to interpret and apply the term need to makes use of interpretative
strategies such as analogies and teleological and systematic understandings. This is
exactly what the Tallinn Manual does when linking the prohibition on the use of
force to cyberoperations.
First of all, it applies by analogy the ‘scale and effects’ test that the International
Court of Justice used inNicaragua to determinewhether an intervention constitutes
an ‘armedattack’ giving rise to self-defence.While theManual accepts thedifference
between the terms ‘use of force’ and ‘armed attack’,74 it regards the ‘scale and effects’
criterion as useful to distinguish ‘acts that qualify as uses of force from those that do
not’.75 This test, however, still leaves much room for interpretation when applied
to concrete situations. While the Manual acknowledges this,76 it also makes an
unusual attempt to reduce theuncertainty surrounding the scope of theprohibition
on the use of force. TheManual states that ‘the International Group of Experts took
notice of an approach that seeks to assess the likelihood that Stateswill characterize
a cyberoperation as a use of force’.77What follows in the report is a list of factors that
states could take into account, factors that are taken froman article by the chairman
of the Tallinn group of experts written some 14 years ago.78
At ﬁrst sight, it may seem that the inclusion of this list of factors helps to reduce
uncertainties regarding the application of the prohibition on the use of force to
cyberoperations. In its current formulation, however, it is more likely that the
inclusion will produce the opposite effect: it ofﬁcially stamps the uncertainties
surrounding the scope of the prohibition in the context of cyberattacks. This is not
just because the factors themselves are unavoidably phrased in language that still
leaves room for different interpretations. There are threemore fundamental reasons
why the report reintroduces uncertainty through its invocation of expertise.
First, the status of the factors themselves remains highly uncertain. They are
clearly not presented as reﬂective of the opinio juris of states and are not derived from
the established sources of international law. Instead, they are presented as empir-
ical in nature, as ‘factors that inﬂuence States making use of force assessments’.79
74 As may be recalled, the Court regarded an armed attack (as mentioned in Art. 51 of the UN Charter) as ‘one
of the most grave forms of use of force’, that gives rise to a right to self-defense for the victim state. In order
to determine whether a use of force is of such magnitude as to constitute an armed attack, the Court used
the ‘scale and effects’ test: it examined the consequences of a particular use of force in order to determine
whether it also constitutes an armed attack.
75 Rule 11, under 1.
76 See, for example, theway inwhich theManual dealswith thequestionwhether affording sanctuary amounts
to an illegal use of force under international law. A majority (in other words, not all members) answered
this in the negative, but added that ‘the provision of sanctuary coupled with other acts, such as substantial
support or providing cyber defences for the non-State group could, in certain circumstances, be a use of force’
(my italics). What the ‘could’ and the ‘certain circumstances’ entail is not spelled out further.
77 Rule11,under8.Note that theManualuses thecareful formulation ‘tooknotice’. The restof the text, however,
doesmore than just ‘noticing’: it takes up the approach as an apparently useful tool in assessing cyberattacks.
78 M. N. Schmitt, ‘Computer Networks and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative
Framework’, (1999) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 885, at 914. The factors include: severity of the
attack, immediacy of the response, directness of the link between the attack and theharmdone, invasiveness
of the attack, measurability of the effects, military character of the attack, state involvement in the attack,
presumptive legality of actions under international law generally.
79 Para. 9.
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However, the factors are not derived from empirical research either. Instead, they
follow fromamore intuitive approach spelled out in earlier academic articles by the
director of the group of experts, Michael Schmitt. The validity of these criteria, in
other words, rests on the intuition, experience, and professionalism of its members,
more than on independent sources that provide independent backing. This raises
the question why states would follow these intuitions regarding the factual beha-
viour of states when confronted with normative questions regarding the scope of
application of the prohibition on the use of force. States should do so, the Manual
argues, because they ‘must be highly sensitive to the international community’s
probable assessment of whether operations violate the prohibition on the use of
force’.80 This, however, only raises the question regarding the nature of the factors
identiﬁed. Should states take them into account because they already have normat-
ive force, as they reﬂect opinio juris?Or should states do sooutof self-interest, because
they will otherwise run the risk of adverse consequences? Or should the factors be
regarded as an attempt to seduce states to start developing customary law along the
lines suggested by the Manual? And irrespective of the answers to these questions,
why would states follow recommendations not based on empirical or normative
research, but on the intuition of experts?
Second, the factors themselves are quite radically relativized in the Manual. The
Manual argues that the factors are not to be taken as exhaustive and that states
‘depending on the circumstancesmay look to others, such as the prevailing political
environment,whethertheoperationportendsthefutureuseofmilitaryforceandthe
identity of the attacker, any record of cyberoperations of the attacker’.81 By bringing
in the political environment, risk assessments, and conjectures as to the status of
the attacker, the Manual quite explicitly moves legal considerations into the realm
of political deliberation and contextual analysis. Rather than providing pre-given
criteria against which political actions can be assessed, theManualmakes the scope
of the prohibition on the use of force dependent on unspeciﬁed circumstances such
as the ‘prevailing political environment’. Indeed, this may very well be a correct
empirical analysis. However, as parts of an expert group on international law it
reads as an ofﬁcial stamping of the radical uncertainties that surround one of the
cornerstone provisions of the UN Charter.
4. CONCLUSION
Cyberspace is increasingly imagined in terms of threats to critical infrastructure
and discussed in terms of war and military strategy. The threats associated with
cyberspace, however, are difﬁcult tomanage in termsof the establishedvocabularies
in international law and politics. Strategies such as deterrence or containment are
as problematic in answer to cyberthreats as are many of the classical distinctions
and principles that underpin international conﬂict and security law. The advent
of cybersecurity as ‘policy goal’, in other words, has created new complexities and
80 Para. 9.
81 Para. 10.
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uncertainties insofar as these do not ﬁt our traditional distinctions of public and
private or domestic and international. Hence, most of the uncertainties are framed
in terms of risks. The question is thus raised how these uncertainties are reduced
by a legal vocabulary, which is centred around norms, and how this creates power
relations and touches upon question of authority and legitimacy. In this article
we have examined one of the answers to the rise of new uncertainties related to
cyberspace: the establishment of international groups of legal experts, who are
called upon to apply existing law to the threats associated with cyberwar. Themost
recent example is that international group of legal experts established through
NATO, whose ﬁndings have been laid down in the TallinnManual on Cyberwar.
The Tallinn Manual reﬂects many of the paradoxes that inform the use of legal
expertise as awayof absorbinguncertainties. Theauthorityof theManual is claimed
to rest on both personal and impersonal sources, both on the speciﬁc characteristics
of the individual members of the group and on allegedly impersonal sources of
law. In terms of outcomes, the Manual reduces uncertainty through consensus on
some issues, but also reproduces or even radicalizes uncertainty: it makes authori-
tative claims in the absence of consensus on the proper interpretation of rules and
principles and reintroduces open-ended principles and contextual factors in legal
reasoning. Thenet effect is that theTallinnManual often reﬂects and solidﬁes rather
than reduces the uncertainties that come with issues of cyberwar.
